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Abstract. This paper puts forward and defends an account of mathematical truth, and in par-
ticular an account of the truth of mathematical axioms. The proposal attempts to be completely
nonrevisionist. In this connection, it seeks to satisfy simultaneously both horns of Benacerraf’s
dilemma. The account builds upon Georg Kreisel’s work on informal rigour. Kreisel defends the
view that axioms are arrived at by a rigorous examination of our informal notions, as opposed to
being stipulated or arrived at by trial and error. This view is then supplemented by a Fregean account
of the objectivity and our knowledge of abstract objects. It is then argued that the resulting view faces
no insurmountable metaphysical or epistemic obstacles.
§1. Introduction. Benacerraf’s (1973) paper ‘Mathematical truth’ presents a problem
with which any position in the philosophy of mathematics must come to terms.
Benacerraf’s paper is often seen as presenting a dilemma where common sense seems to
pull in opposite directions. Common sense with respect to the truth and the syntactical form
of mathematical statements leads us to conclude that mathematical propositions concern
abstract objects. At the same time, common sense with respect to epistemology seems to
imply that mathematical propositions cannot concern abstract objects. It is quite generally
accepted that no existing position on the philosophy of mathematics is completely adequate
in its handling of the Benacerraf dilemma. It is the goal of this paper to show that a
position on the philosophy of mathematics that will strike most practicing mathematicians
as very natural can aptly handle the Benacerraf challenge. The position I outline is inspired
by the view that Kreisel (1967) presents and defends in his Informal rigour and com-
pleteness proofs. However, the position I put forward here is in certain respects different
from Kreisel’s own.1 The principal difference is the supplementation of the Kreiselian
account with a Fregean position on abstract objects and the epistemology thereof. I will
outline two very natural constraints on an account of mathematical truth. I will then show
that these constraints are not only natural but also can be accepted without causing any
insurmountable philosophical problems. I aim ultimately to show that a Kreiselian position
on how we arrive at axioms together with a Fregean position on our knowledge of abstract
objects gives us an extremely natural solution to Benacerraf’s dilemma.
Section 2 of this paper will outline the Benacerraf problem. Since Field’s reformula-
tion of the Benacerraf problem (so as not to presuppose a causal theory of knowledge and
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1 In fact the final position will be somewhat Carnapian. Since, to discuss in detail in what respects
the position is Carnapian would take us too far off course, I will simply refer the reader to my
Lavers (2008) for a detailed discussion of the relation between Kreisel and Carnap’s philosophy
of mathematics. Mention of Carnap will therefore be limited.
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reference) is the version on which most contemporary discussion focuses, this reformu-
lation will be presented as well. Section 3 will be a brief presentation of Kreisel’s views
on informal mathematics. In Section 4, I discuss Field and Kreisel on the epistemology of
mathematics. I conclude this section by presenting a principle linking mathematical truth
with what we can demonstrate, and I argue that it should be accepted barring any insur-
mountable metaphysical or epistemic reasons not to. In the fifth section I discuss mathemat-
ical ontology. I introduce another principle guaranteeing the disquotation of mathematical
claims. I further argue that a Fregean view on abstract objects can be used to show the
two principles just mentioned can be accepted without the introduction of insurmountable
philosophical problems. In the final section I consider several objections to the account that
I put forward.
§2. The Benacerraf dilemma. Benacerraf (1973) begins his paper by proposing two
concerns for a theory of mathematical truth:
(1) The concern for having a homogeneous semantical theory in which the semantics for
the propositions of mathematics parallel the semantics for the rest of the language.
(2) The concern that an account of mathematical truth mesh with a reasonable episte-
mology. (p. 73)
The reason for the second condition is obvious, but why should we accept the first
concern? Benacerraf asks the reader to consider the following two sentences:
(1) There are at least three large cities older than New York.
(2) There are at least three perfect numbers greater than 17.
Both of these sentences seem to have the form:
(3) There are at least three FG’s that bear relation R to a.
The understanding of (2) on the model of (3) is dubbed the standard view. The standard
view interprets quantification in mathematics as equivalent to quantification in other areas
of study. Benacerraf contrasts the standard view with what he calls combinatorial views.
The standard view takes the surface syntax of mathematical propositions seriously—
understands them to involve names and quantification—and uses a Tarskian semantics
to give their truth conditions. A combinatorial view, on the other hand, dispenses with
a semantic account of truth conditions and equates truth with provability in some system.
The combinatorial view has the advantage of conforming to the second of Benacerraf’s
concerns: it makes it clear how it is that mathematical propositions are known. No notion
of abstract objects or our knowledge thereof is necessary for a combinatorial account of
mathematical truth.2
The combinatorial view satisfies the second of Benacerraf’s concerns at the expense of
satisfying the first. Benacerraf also holds that the standard view satisfies the first concern
2 In fact, Benacerraf is less strict than one might assume given the above description. It is important
to note that, in discussing the combinatorial view, Benacerraf explicitly considers not only purely
formal systems but also formal systems augmented with an ω-rule. There is no evidence in the
text to suggest that having something other than a purely formal definition of mathematical truth
poses special epistemological problems. This is important given that the account of mathematical
truth that I will defend involves informal reasoning.
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at the expense of the second. As is well known, Benacerraf’s (1973) defense of this claim
involves the causal theory of both knowledge and reference.
I favor a causal account of knowledge on which for X to know that S is
true requires some causal relationship between X and the referents of the
names, predicates and quantifiers in S. I believe in addition in a causal
theory of reference, thus making the link to my knowing S doubly causal.
(p. 671)
Once one accepts a causal theory of knowledge and reference, platonism is ruled out.
Platonists believe that mathematical objects are abstract, and thus not the kind of objects
that we interact with in the physical world, but the standard view need not be platonistic.
We could continue to hold that mathematical statements involve names and quantification,
if mathematical objects were interpreted as objects in the physical world (i.e., objects we
causally interact with). The naturalness of the standard view, however, would be lost. So,
given a causal theory of knowledge and reference, the prospects for the standard view look
bleak. For all that, whereas causal theories of truth and reference were the way to go in
1973, they no longer hold such appeal.
Hartry Field has offered a formulation of Benacerraf’s dilemma that does not depend on
a causal theory of knowledge (or reference). Most contemporary commentators therefore
address Field’s formulation instead of Benacerraf’s. Field’s idea is to change the focus
from the justification of our mathematical beliefs to an explanation of their reliability. By
doing so, Field (1989) avoids an appeal to any specific theory of knowledge or reference.
[T]he claim [that the platonist must explain] is just that the following
schema
If mathematicians accept ‘p’, then p
(and a partial but hard to state converse of it) holds in nearly all instances,
where ‘p’ is replaced by a mathematical sentence (p. 26).
That this is essentially the Benacerraf problem should be clear. Disquotation preserves
syntactic form, and so the mathematical statements under consideration still concern ab-
stract objects as their surface syntax suggests. But rather than formulate the problem
in terms of knowledge, which would therefore depend on one’s epistemic theory, Field
reformulates the problem in terms of reliability, which is independent of one’s epistemic
theory.3
Field does not claim that we can make no progress toward explaining the reliability of
our mathematical beliefs. We could appeal to provability, but that will get us only so far.
I do not mean to suggest that the platonist can do nothing towards ex-
plaining the general regularity given by [the disquotational schema] and
its partial converse. For as mathematics has become more deductively
systematized, the truth of mathematics has become reduced to the truth
of a smaller and smaller set of basic axioms; so we could explain the fact
that the mathematicians’ beliefs tend to be true by the fact that we could
3 There is one difference between Field’s formulation and Benacerraf’s besides the change of
focus from justification to explanation: Field poses his version as a challenge to the defender
of platonism whereas Benacerraf presents two apparently conflicting concerns.
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deduce them from the axioms, if we could just explain the fact that what
mathematicians take as axioms tend to be true. (Field, 1989, p. 231)
Furthermore, Field allows that we can make some progress toward explaining the regular
truth of the axioms by pointing out that the totality of what mathematicians take as axioms
tends to be consistent. And we can in turn partially explain this by pointing out that over
time inconsistencies with proposed axioms have been eliminated when actually discov-
ered. However, Field argues that these partial explanations do not go nearly far enough.
It would be absurd to explain the reliability of someone’s beliefs about the physical world
by pointing out that they follow from a set of axioms that have not yet been found to be
inconsistent.
§3. Informal mathematics. For an account of the reliability of mathematicians’ be-
liefs about the axioms of mathematics, we now turn to Kreisel’s account of informal rigour.
In his 1965 presentation at the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science
Georg Kreisel defends a very commonsense view of mathematics. His presentation is
published in 1967 as Informal rigour and completeness proofs. Although he stresses the
importance of formalization in mathematics, Kreisel (1967) contends that mathematical
reasoning begins by an analysis of our intuitive notions.
The ‘old fashioned idea’ is that one obtains rules and definitions by
analyzing intuitive notions and putting down their properties. This is
certainly what mathematicians thought they were doing when defining
length or area or, for that matter, logicians when defining rules of in-
ference or axioms (properties) of mathematical structures such as the
continuum. (p. 138)
Kreisel calls this process of examining our intuitive notions and determining their prop-
erties informal rigour.
Kreisel aims to criticize what he calls pragmatist or positivistic philosophies of math-
ematics. These ‘anti-philosophic’ philosophies of mathematics dismiss intuitive notions
as being too vague to play any serious role in mathematics. Mathematics, according to
such views, proceeds by stipulating arbitrary axioms and then deriving their formal con-
sequences. Pragmatism rejects the importance of intuitive notions by laying emphasis on
fruitfulness as opposed to faithfulness. Positivism, on the other hand, contends that the
content of our intuitive notions lies exclusively in the formal operations that we perform
with them.4 What is wrong with these two views? “Quite simply this. Though they raise
perfectly legitimate doubts or possibilities, they just do not respect the facts, at least the
facts of actual intellectual experience.” (Kreisel, 1967, p. 141, original italics)
But beyond criticizing these ‘anti-philosophic’ philosophies, Kreisel’s main aim is to
demonstrate that we do have a sufficiently clear understanding of, for instance, the natural
numbers or the cumulative type structure (the universe of sets). This understanding goes
beyond what is captured by first-order formalizations. “A moment’s reflection shows that
the evidence for the first-order axiom schema derives from the second-order [axioms].”
(Kreisel, 1967, p. 148)
4 It is unclear who falls under Kreisel’s categories of ‘pragmatist’ or ‘positivist’. Although, the
category of positivist was intended to include Carnap, I have argued (Lavers, 2008) that this is
not the case.
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It may seem as if the paradoxes in set theory show that informal rigour is not actu-
ally very reliable. We apparently had an idea of set that seemed to conform to the naı¨ve
comprehension principle. Once we began to explore the properties of such sets we found
that our intuitive concept is inconsistent. On Kreisel’s diagnosis, however, it is not that
we had an intuitive idea of an inconsistent concept. What we actually had was a vague
concept that was a mixture of three intuitive notions: sets of individuals, sets of something
(which satisfies only a restricted comprehension axiom), and properties or intensions.
It is by examining our notion of set of something that we arrive at our understanding of the
cumulative type structure.
Zermelo’s analysis furnishes an instance of a rigorous discovery of ax-
ioms (for the notion of set). To avoid trivial misunderstanding note this:
What one means here is that the intuitive notion of the cumulative type
structure provides a coherent source of axioms; our understanding is suf-
ficient to avoid an endless string of ambiguities to be resolved by further
basic distinctions, like the distinction above between abstract proper-
ties and sets of something. [...] the actual formulation of the axioms
played an auxiliary rather than basic role in Zermelo’s work: the intuitive
analysis of the crude mixture of notions, namely the description of the
type structure, led to the axioms: these constitute the record, not the
instrument of clarification. (Kreisel, 1967, pp. 144–145, original italics)
Of course, Kreisel is aware of disputes within mathematics itself. The existence of these
disputes might lead one to conclude that where our ordinary understanding of a notion
gives no clear pronouncement, we are free to make arbitrary stipulations. Kreisel (1967)
believes that this conclusion is unwarranted:
[O]ne sometimes criticizes complacently ‘old fashioned’ disputes on the
right definition of measure or the right topology, because there are sev-
eral definitions. The most striking fact here is how few definitions seem
to be useful: these haven’t dropped from heaven; they, obviously, were
formulated before their applications were made, and they were not gen-
erally obtained by trial and error. If they had been so obtained, mathe-
maticians shouldn’t be as contemptuous as they are about the study of
little variants in definitions. (p. 142, original italics)
Kreisel’s position then is that our ordinary understanding of the concepts natural number
or set, for instance, played a central role in the development of number theory and set the-
ory. The axioms are arrived at by an analysis of these notions. If something is independent
of a certain axiom system we are not free to claim that it has no truth value (or to decide
the matter by arbitrary stipulation), for a further analysis of our informal concepts may
be sufficient to answer the question of its truth or falsity.5 This is clearly a very natural
5 Interestingly Field (1994, 1998) himself, in a series of papers, has argued that we could not
possess a mathematical concept that could not be formalized in a first-order theory, and as a
result our mathematical notions must be highly indeterminate. If considerations of space were
not an issue I would argue that the situation is a stalemate between Field and the philosopher who
wishes to defend the determinacy of mathematical notions. Field’s (1994) position relies heavily
on his assumption that “on any reasonable way of making ‘implicitly accepts’ precise, the set of
sentences and inference rules that a person implicitly accepts at a given time is almost certainly
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position on mathematical truth. What the rest of this paper will explore is the degree to
which an acceptable answer to Benacerraf’s dilemma can be built around this position.
§4. Epistemology and informal mathematics. As we saw above, Field demands of
a supporter of the standard view an account of the reliability of our mathematical beliefs.
In presenting his interpretation of the Benacerraf dilemma, Field (1989) writes:
Benacerraf’s challenge—or at least, the challenge which his paper sug-
gests to me—is to provide an account of the mechanism that explains
how our beliefs about these remote entities can so well respect the facts
about them. The idea is, if it appears in principle impossible to explain
this, then this tends to undermine the belief in mathematical entities,
despite whatever reason we might have for believing in them. (p. 26,
original italics)
We also saw above that Field accepts that the platonist can reduce the problem of
explaining the reliability of mathematical propositions generally, to the problem of ex-
plaining the reliability of the axioms that we accept. Kreisel, on the other hand, defends
a commonsense view on how we come to accept axioms. We accept axioms because we
deem them to be true of our informal notions.
Now, the position Kreisel puts forward is not an explanation of how informal mathemat-
ics works. Kreisel is concerned to argue that we can do this, even if we don’t yet know
exactly how. In fact, he is explicit on this point in his joint work with Jean-Louis Krivine:
We do not pretend to have a theory of a mechanism which explains how
we come to form intuitive notions which are so astonishingly successful;
for example how the founders of dynamics set up equations of motions
for rigid bodies or ideal fluids on the basis of qualitative impressions and
derived quantitative conclusions from these equations. But we regard it
as absurd to reject the use of this ability just because we don’t have a
theoretical explanation; this is what the formalist doctrine of precision
does. (Kreisel & Krivine, 1971, p. 169)
What should stand out about the previous two quotations is that both Kreisel and Field
appear to be speaking about the same mechanism, that is, whatever mechanism is the one
which allows us to write down axioms that are true of, for instance, sets or natural numbers.
Field maintains that if it is in principle impossible to explain such a mechanism, we should
conclude that we have no such ability. Kreisel’s argument, of course, works the other way.
Given that it is a fact of ‘actual intellectual experience’ that we have such an ability, it
makes no sense to deny it just because we don’t have a proper theoretical explanation of
it. So the situation seems to be a classic case of one philosopher’s modus ponens being
another’s modus tollens.
At this point it is important to make a distinction. The question of whether we have
the ability to do informal mathematics in essentially the manner described by Kreisel
can be interpreted in two ways. On the strong reading we analyze our intuitive notions
and thereby obtain truths which hold in the completely independent and self-subsisting
platonic realm of mathematical objects. However, there is a weaker reading that makes no
recursive (and might well be finite).” (p. 402) It is unclear why the defender of the determinacy
of our mathematical notions would have to accept this assumption.
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such metaphysical claims. On the weaker reading we have an understanding of concepts
like set and natural number that possess more properties than they can be shown to have
in any particular formal system. Our understanding of these concepts can thus be a source
of axioms. That is, prior to a formulation of an axiom system, there is at least a community
that shares an informal notion.6 Axioms are produced by analyzing this notion and identi-
fying what is true of it. On this weak reading our ability to do informal mathematics does
not commit us to any particular metaphysical view.
With this distinction in place we can see that Kreisel and Field do not actually—contrary
to what seemed to be the case above—hold opposing positions on the same issue. Kreisel’s
arguments support what I have called the weak reading, while Field’s discussion of the
Benacerraf problem attacks the strong reading. Field (1989) believes the insurmountable
problem for the platonist is to explain how we have knowledge of completely indepen-
dently existing realms.
It is rather as if someone claimed that his or her belief states about
the daily happenings in a remote village in Nepal were nearly all dis-
quotationally true, despite the absence of any mechanism to explain the
correlation between those belief states and the happenings in the village.
Surely we should accept this only as a last resort. (p. 27)
In order to avoid the problem illustrated in this quotation (which I will call Field’s
Nepalese village objection), I want to assume that we have the ability to do informal
mathematics without making any assumption that this ability gives us access to completely
independent truths. That is, I want to assume that we can do informal mathematics, roughly
as Kreisel describes, but without any assumption that we thereby obtain truths concerning
an independently existing domain. I will follow Kreisel and Field in taking this ability to be
not fully explained. I will not offer an explanation of this ability, but merely assume, for the
time being, that we possess it. So even with this assumption a complete answer to Field’s
challenge will not be given. A complete answer would have to include an explanation of
this ability.
Saying that the ability to do informal mathematics is not fully explained is not to say
that we have no idea how informal mathematics functions. Analyzing our intuitive notions
to arrive at further axioms may seem like a mysterious process, but it has of course many
straightforward instances. For instance consider the natural numbers. Let T be a first-order
theory of arithmetic in a language L . Let L+ extend L by the addition of new constants.
Models of T for which induction does not hold for properties involving the new constants
are not candidates for the structure we intend when we speak informally of the natural
numbers. Instances of the induction schema involving the new properties could then be
added as further axioms.
The idea that we are able to do informal mathematics amounts to holding that we do not
formulate axioms on the basis of trial and error, but that there is an intuitive notion being
analyzed prior to the formulation of the axioms, and relative to which the axioms are true.
For instance, it holds of our conception of natural number that every natural number has a
successor, and that induction holds for every property of the natural numbers. Likewise, by
careful examination of our notion of ‘set’ we notice that the various axioms of set theory
6 I do not want to rule out the limiting case where the community consists of only one person. The
important point is that the informal notion exists prior to the formulation of the axioms, and that
it could be shared by more than one person.
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hold.7 Notice, it is not being claimed that these informal notions are innate ideas or that
they are shared universally by all human beings. All that is being claimed is that there is
at least some group of mathematicians who understand the informal notion well enough to
realize that the axioms are true of it. To deny this is to claim that mathematics is the study
of arbitrary axiom systems.
Kreisel is well known for claiming that, by analyzing our informal notions, we could in
principle determine the truth value of any mathematical statement of interest to us. If we
examine our intuitions carefully enough, we can determine, for instance, an answer to the
continuum hypothesis. However, we needn’t follow Kreisel on this point. One may wish
to hold that we have an understanding of notions like the ‘natural numbers’ that transcend
any purely formal axiomatization without claiming that all mathematical questions can be
answered by examining our intuitions. I believe this is a point about which the best course
of action is to suspend judgment. We should hold that an examination of our intuitive
notions may lead to a further axiom that settles the continuum hypothesis. However, I
do not see why we should hold dogmatically to the idea that in principle all interesting
mathematical questions can be answered.
What I wish to do in the remainder of this section is to explore the consequence of
taking Kreisel’s ‘old-fashioned idea’ seriously. That is, I would like to explore what view
of mathematical truth follows naturally from the assumption that our understanding of
informal notions plays an essential role in mathematics. To this end I will introduce the
predicate Dem. Dem is to cover anything that is demonstrable on the basis of informal
rigour. Axioms identified by an analysis of informal notions are then to have the property
Dem. Since for the present purposes, I am interested in classical mathematical truth any-
thing deducible in classical logic from the identified axioms is to have the property as well.
Also, as Kreisel stresses, certain facts about the integers, for instance, are only provable
by embedding the integers into a larger system. Propositions obtained then, by embedding
one system in a larger one, are to have the property Dem as well.
Dem, it was said, is to represent the property of being demonstrable on the basis of
informal rigour. Of course, this is far from a formal definition, but anyone who holds
that what cannot be given a formal definition is so unclear that it can serve no purpose
is strongly advised to read Kreisel’s article. In most cases, but not all, it will be quite
unproblematic to decide if some proposition has the property Dem or not. I certainly do
not claim that there will be universal agreement in all cases, just that the borderline cases
are the exception and not the rule.
There is clearly an obvious connection between what we call true in mathematics and
the property Dem. This connection can be summarized in the following principle (called
DI T for demonstrability implies truth):
(DI T ) Dem(A) ⊃ True(A).
When Tarski wished to define a truth predicate he wanted it to apply to those sentences
which we ordinarily call true. Since we are interested in the concept of truth as it is used
in the special case of mathematics, we ought to, if at all possible, seek a concept that
applies to those sentences that we ordinarily call true. There may be overriding epistemic
or metaphysical reasons why we cannot have such a concept, but in the absence of such
7 Obviously much more could be, and has been, said on this point, but the subject will not be
discussed further here. For a discussion of these issues see for instance Boolos (1983), Parsons
(1983), and Wang (1983).
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reasons we should attempt to formulate a conception of mathematical truth that applies
to those sentences that we consider to be true. Without such reasons, anyone who holds a
revisionist position is being revisionist for revisionism’s sake. Furthermore, the goal here
is to defend a position that satisfies both horns of Benacerraf’s dilemma; it would certainly
be too strict a requirement on such a position that it rule out the possibility of all views that
abandon one of the two horns. In the next section I will defend the position that there are
no overriding epistemic or metaphysical reasons forcing us to assume a revisionist attitude
toward truth in mathematics.
Before moving on, however, I would like to briefly discuss an objection to the principle
DI T . Accepting DI T , it could be argued, amounts to embracing a form of conventional-
ism. After all, accepting DI T amounts to stipulating that what we can identify as being
true of some informal notion is true. The first thing that can be said in response to this
charge is that every account of mathematical truth will involve some stipulations. Secondly,
in defense against the charge of conventionalism, this restriction on mathematical truth is
about the most natural one available. So, it may be a stipulation, but it is by no means an
arbitrary stipulation.
§5. Ontology and informal mathematics. Accepting DI T , it might be claimed,
amounts to what Benacerraf called a combinatorial view. However, I do not wish to replace
truth with demonstrability. What I wish to show is that a view on mathematical truth that
is not revisionist can be shown to be metaphysically and epistemically defensible.
DI T links truth with what we recognize as true of our intuitive notions. And these in
turn involve names and quantification. For instance when examining our notion of natural
number we can recognize both that zero is a natural number and that all natural numbers
have a successor. It is in this form that they are suggested by examining our notion of
natural number. It may be possible to translate these sentences into sentences that do not
use names or quantify over numbers, but if we did this we could not cite our understanding
of the concept of natural number as justification of the translated sentence.8 Since we are
here interested in a (nonrevisionist) notion of mathematical truth based on what we can
determine by analysis of our mathematical concepts, we should take the syntax of the
statements so suggested at face value. So like DI T a nonrevisionist principle which states
that we should take the surface syntax of mathematical propositions at face value should
be accepted if there are no overriding philosophical problems caused by accepting such a
principle. In addition to DI T , then, a nonrevisionist about mathematical truth would have
to accept O N T (for ontology):
(ONT) True(A) ≡ A.
Clearly, if DI T and O N T can be defended together then both horns of Benacerraf’s
dilemma will be satisfied. DI T explains how we know certain mathematical truths—the
ones that we can demonstrate; while O N T implies that we take their syntax at face value.
Let us look for a second specifically at Field’s formulation of the problem. Recall that
Field maintained that if we could explain how the axioms of mathematical theories are
disquotationally true, then the rest follows. Well, any axioms identified by analysis of our
informal notions are true by DI T , and O N T guarantees disquotation.
8 Or at least not without a great deal more explanation.
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Of course, this solution to Benacerraf’s dilemma presupposes DI T and O N T , which
have not yet been argued for. All that I have argued so far is that DI T and O N T should be
accepted if there are no overriding metaphysical or epistemic reasons not to accept them.
What I want to argue now is that a view of mathematical truth that conforms to DI T and
O N T can be defended that avoids any insuperable epistemic or metaphysical problems.
So what are the prima facie metaphysical and epistemic reasons against holding both DI T
and O N T as constraints on accounts of mathematical truth? Well, together they imply that
there are mathematical objects and that we can know about them simply by examining
our intuitions and making deductive inferences. How, then, are we any better off than the
person in Field’s Nepalese village objection? In order to show that we are actually better
off in the case of mathematics than the case of the person who claims disquotationally true
beliefs about the events in a remote village of Nepal, we need to begin by addressing the
question of how we know that there are mathematical objects with the properties we take
them to have. I believe the most progress in terms of answering this question is to be found
in the work of Frege.9
In section 62 of The Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege famously asks “How, then, are
numbers to be given to us, if we cannot have ideas or intuitions of them?”10 In giving his
answer Frege (1980) cites his context principle which advises one “never to ask for the
meaning of a term in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition.” (p. x) Given the
context principle the question of our knowledge of the numbers becomes the question of
how we can fix the truth conditions for statements involving number. This move on Frege’s
part has rightly been recognized as revolutionary (see, for instance, Dummett, 1991, and
Hale & Wright, 2002). A large obstacle to the acceptance of abstract objects is that it
is unclear how we could have a coherent practice of making claims about them. Frege
eliminates this obstacle by changing the epistemic question of our access to such objects
into the semantic question of fixing truth conditions. Once we fix the truth conditions for
claims involving number, there remains no mystery of how we have a coherent practice of
establishing claims about the numbers.
In the case of the present paper we can follow Frege’s example as follows. We put
forward DI T as a constraint on mathematical truth. That is, we say that any more de-
tailed account of mathematical truth must satisfy DI T . This fixes the truth conditions
sufficiently well that we can have a coherent practice of establishing claims about math-
ematical objects. Remember, I am not committed to the Kreiselian view that we could
in principle answer any mathematical question of interest by employing the method of
informal rigour. This leaves it open that the truth conditions for mathematical statements
may not be completely determined by DI T . However, even if this is so, DI T is sufficient
9 I look to Frege to show that a view that conforms to DI T and O N T can avoid insuperable
metaphysical and epistemic problems. Despite this reliance on Frege, there are significant
differences between the view I am defending and that of the neo-Fregeans. The principal
difference is that I place no special weight on abstraction principles. A view based on the idea
of Kreisel’s informal rigour agrees with Quine that deciding what is an axiom and what is a
theorem is like deciding which points in Ohio are starting points. Getting into too much detail
on the similarities and differences between the account presented here would take us too far off
course. The few comparisons that will be made will be, for the most part, limited to footnotes.
The neo-Fregeans address Benacerraf’s problem most directly in Hale & Wright (2002).
10 Of course, Kreisel does talk of our intuitive understanding of concepts like ‘set’ or ‘natural
number’, but nothing he says commits him to the view that intuition is some quasi-perceptual
faculty.
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to ground a coherent practice of establishing mathematical claims.11 We then follow Frege
in saying that once we have sufficiently well determined the truth conditions for statements
involving a class of terms there is no further question of whether these things really exist
and how it is that we know this. Once we fix the truth conditions we are free to take the
terms introduced to refer. That is, given a Fregean view on abstract objects and DI T as a
constraint on accounts of mathematical truth we are justified in holding O N T .
At this point one might likely object to the Fregean view on abstract objects itself. The
objector would claim that either there are numbers and sets and so forth or there are not.
That is, either the world is a model of our mathematical theories or it is not. The Fregean
picture, the objection continues, is predicated on the incoherent view that reality is an
amorphous lump awaiting to be carved up by our theories.12
It is true, the philosophical view that reality is an amorphous lump is often dismissed as
not quite coherent. The intuition behind it—that the-world-as-it-is-in-itself is not divided
into discrete domains of various logical types13—may seem attractive enough, but given
that a further clarification of this intuition is not forthcoming the view is often rejected.
However, I think this rejection is too hasty. Does this mean I am advocating the acceptance
of a notoriously vague philosophical position? No—the proper way to understand the view
that reality is an amorphous lump, is not as a positive theory but as the rejection of a vague
philosophical position. Notice even in the brief description above, the position is stated in
the negative. The reading of the amorphous lump view as a positive thesis I will call the
strong reading, and the view that merely rejects a certain thesis I will call the weak reading.
The philosophical position being rejected by the weak reading is that somehow the-world-
as-it-is-in-itself is the kind of thing that could be a model of our theories and as such plays
the role of ultimately determining the correctness of our semantic theories. This position,
rejected by the weak reading, I will call the ultra-realist position. The strong reading makes
a positive claim about the ultimate structure of the world. That is that the world is such that
we can carve it up with our language.
11 The position I defend in this paper is realist about abstract objects. This is what is needed to
satisfy the first horn of Benacerraf’s dilemma. It is not realist in the sense of being committed
to a completely bivalent semantics (although it would be compatible with this). Dummett
(1978) argues that realism/antirealism debates should be understood to question the existence
of realist truth conditions, instead of the existence of objects. This is motivated by the fact that
the intuitionist about arithmetic is committed to the existence of numbers just as the classical
number theorist is. For the present purposes, however, we are concerned with the existence of
objects. Dummett often suggests that there is something illegitimate or incoherent about classical
mathematics. Classical mathematical truth is neither incoherent nor illegitimate, it is a very
clear and extremely useful notion worthy of analysis. It may, however, not be fully determinate.
By taking the closure, under classical consequence, of the axioms we identify, we might not fix the
truth conditions of every mathematical statement. If we consider a statement A for which neither
it nor its negation has the property Dem, then although DI T implies the truth of A∨ ∼ A it
neither implies the truth of A nor of ∼ A. In this way, everything we take to be a truth of classical
mathematics (including, all instances, of the law of the excluded middle) turns out to have the
property Dem. However, I don’t see this (potential) indeterminacy as reason to claim that we are
not dealing with a domain of objects. Even the discourse concerning observable objects and their
properties is not completely determinate.
12 The term ‘amorphous lump’ is taken from Dummett (1981).
13 Wittgenstein, of course, held that everything is of the same logical type. But how many logical
types there are is not really the problem. What seems hard to swallow is that the world-as-it-is-
in-itself is the kind of thing that could be a model of our theories.
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Notice that the coherence of the ultra-realist view is tied to the coherence of the strong
reading of the amorphous lump view. Are numbers objects? Somehow, the ultra-realist
view contends, the-world-as-it-is-in-itself will decide such questions. If this view could
be made clear, then clarifying the strong reading of the view that reality is an amorphous
lump would be no problem at all—it would amount to claiming that ultimately reality does
not have the structure of a model. One cannot reject the view that reality is not divided
into discrete domains of various types on the basis that the view is unclear, and then
simply proceed on the assumption that it is so arranged. To do this would be to argue:
∼P cannot be made sufficiently clear, and so we must reject it and assert P . Of course,
under a particular description the world can either be or fail to be a model of our theories.
However, the question of whether, independently of any description, the world is a model of
our theories cannot make more sense when answered in the affirmative than in the negative.
The weak reading of the amorphous lump view, can reject both the strong reading and the
ultra-realist position as incoherent.
It is perfectly possible to hold a Fregean view on abstract objects while rejecting as
incoherent the question of whether, ultimately, the world is a model of our theories.14 We
take a term to refer when truth conditions for statements involving it have been sufficiently
clearly spelled out, but we don’t take this as making any claim about the ultimate compo-
sition of reality. What Frege gives us is a way of analyzing reference that does not depend
on our first being able to identify how reality itself is divided into discrete objects.
One of the motivations, as we saw above, for Benacerraf’s claim that mathematical
statements involve names and quantification, was the desire to treat mathematical claims
as on par with other claims in the language. It might be objected that accepting the Fregean
view on abstract objects amounts to abandoning this motivation. However, this is not so.
It is not only terms for abstract objects that we explain by virtue of them being part
of a coherent practice involving sufficiently well-defined truth conditions for sentences
containing them. There are no terms whose reference we explain by pointing to a relation
between the term and the thing-in-itself. We can take the singular term ‘Jones’s car’ to
refer because we have a coherent practice of speaking about people’s cars. The reason I
take it to refer is not because I am aware of a Jones’s car as a thing-in-itself and an ultimate
constituent of the world-as-it-is-in-itself. If to know of an entity that it exists we must know
that it is an ultimate constituent of the world-as-it-is-in-itself, then all ontological questions
become hopeless. It is perhaps for this reason that the existence of every kind of thing has
actually been disputed.
Although the view I am defending maintains that we can refer to and have knowledge of
abstract objects, it may be objected that it is not sufficiently platonistic since it abandons the
ultra-realist view. However, claiming that to answer Benacerraf’s dilemma we must show
that the numbers exist in the sense of the ultra-realist view is too strong a requirement. Be-
nacerraf’s dilemma is meant to be a problem about abstract objects. There is no generally
accepted demonstration of the existence, in the ultra-realist sense, of any kind of object.
One of the main obstacles facing those who wish to hold that we can have knowledge of
abstract objects is the ultra-realist view on ontology. Notice, however, as just argued, this is
14 The neo-Fregeans in their discussion of the Benacerraf dilemma (Hale & Wright, 2002) assume a
‘quietist’ position with respect to the question of which of these two views is correct. They admit
that there are problems for their view no matter which of the positions is true, but rest content to
endorse neither one. I think this is clearly not strong enough. That is why I maintain the question
of whether the world is ultimately a model of our theories is to be rejected as incoherent.
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no less an obstacle for nonmathematical objects. Once the ultra-realist view is abandoned,
there is no longer an answer as to whether O N T is ultimately true. So, the goal is not
to argue for the ultimate truth of O N T , but to show that it forms part of a natural and
sufficiently unproblematic way of understanding mathematics. The Fregean position on
reference to abstract objects together with DI T and O N T form such a view.
It can now be explained why it is that we are in a better position in mathematics than the
person in Field’s Nepalese village objection. If we ask how we know a certain mathematical
proposition, we can point to the axioms that were identified by examining our informal
notion as fixing the truth condition for statements involving the term. The person in Field’s
Nepalese village objection is claiming to have knowledge of propositions containing terms
for which truth conditions, for statements involving those terms, are governed by practices
that have nothing to do with anything that is accessible to the person in question. Above I
advocated, and not just in the special case of mathematical terms, the Fregean view that for
a term to refer it is sufficient that truth conditions are spelled out for a sufficiently large class
of sentences that involve it. ‘Seven’ and ‘Pawin’, then, refer because statements involving
them have sufficiently well-defined truth conditions. ‘Seven is prime’ unlike ‘Pawin got
married today’ can be seen to be true on the basis of examining our informal notions and
seeing what follows from them. This is not surprising since the truth condition for the first
of these statements, but certainly not the second, is given in terms of what we can recognize
as true of our informal notions.
§6. Objections to the view. It might be objected that the view being defended is
very unFregean on the objectivity of mathematics.15 Frege clearly wanted to establish
the objective truth of mathematics. It could be argued that this realistic strand in Frege
would lead him to claim that numbers exist prior to our ‘carving up’ reality by laying
down truth conditions for arithmetical statements. That is, one might claim that Frege
must be interpreted as holding the ultra-realist position. There is a lot to be said about
Frege’s position on this issue. However, this is not the place to settle Frege’s views on
this question. What I will argue here is that what Frege does in section 62 of Grundlagen
cannot be seen as even a partial answer to the question of how we can have knowledge
of abstract objects unless the strong form of realism discussed above is rejected. If it is
one thing for something to be an object and another thing to be the reference of a singular
term for which statements involving it have been given sufficiently clear truth conditions,
then Frege has not answered how we can have knowledge of abstract objects. For, in this
case, after spelling out the truth conditions for statements involving numerical terms, Frege
would be left with the question of whether the things whose existence is implied by these
truth conditions (i.e., the numbers) exist and how it is that we could know that this is the
case.
Another Frege-inspired objection to the view being defended here is that it is too psy-
chologistic. Above (Section 4) I made a distinction between two ways of interpreting
the possibility of informal rigour. On the strong interpretation we analyze our informal
concepts and thereby obtain truths that hold completely independently of us. On the weak
interpretation our intuitive notions are a source of axioms but no claim is made that these
axioms are independently true. It is the weak reading that I am defending here. Does the
15 Although the view being defended here takes inspiration from Frege, especially section 62 of
Grundlagen, it is not being claimed that the final view is a Fregean view. For that matter it is not
being claimed either that the final view is Kreiselian.
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claim that mathematics rests ultimately on what we can identify as true of our informal
notions make mathematics overly psychologistic? Well, it certainly does not follow from
the view I am defending that mathematical objects are ideas in people’s minds.16 Frege
himself often assumes that either something is objective and completely independent of us,
or it is subjective and psychological. But there is certainly room for objective claims that
are not completely independent of us. In fact, this can be illustrated by playing with one of
Frege’s own examples. The equator is a fairly arbitrary collection of space-time points. One
might hold that the equator is an ultimate constituent of the universe, but even those who
hold an ultra-realist position about certain kinds of entities might be dubious of this. Truth
conditions, therefore, for the claim that I am now more than 200 km from the equator,
are in part dependent on us. This claim expresses a relation between me and an object
that does not have completely independent existence.17 But it is nonetheless objectively
true that I am more than 200 km from the equator. In order to sufficiently fix the meaning
of statements involving the equator we need only put forward a method for determining
the distance of any point on the globe to the equator. Relative to these truth conditions
many claims about the equator will be objectively true. That is, the conditions for being
more than 200 km from the equator, although put forward by us, are objectively realized.
In the case of mathematical objects introduced by DI T and O N T , although their truth
conditions depend on us for their identification, relative to what we identify as holding of
our informal notions mathematical theorems are objectively true.
One might also charge that the Fregean view being appealed to here is in danger of
being applied too liberally. That is, if we are free to introduce any objects we wish sim-
ply by fixing the truth conditions governing statement involving the new terms, then we
could introduce all kinds of undesirable objects. At this point it may seem that we are
forced into one of two possible positions. First, we might claim with Carnap (1950), that
any arbitrary specifications of truth conditions, for sentences involving a class of terms,
describes a framework, and that there are only pragmatic reasons to prefer one framework
over another. On this view, although certain frameworks may contain various undesirable
objects, for pragmatic reasons we prefer frameworks that do not. Secondly, we could claim,
along with the neo-Fregeans, that there are not several different frameworks, but there are
independently motivated restrictions that in the end allow us to introduce only the objects
that we want. I think, however, there is a third (and intermediate) possibility suggested by
the Kreiselian position that we started with. Recall Kreisel’s remark quoted earlier about
mathematicians being contemptuous of slight variants in definitions. On Kreisel’s ‘old-
fashioned’ view we are not free to introduce any kind of object we wish so long as our
axioms are consistent. We begin by examining our intuitive notions and writing down what
is true of them. So already we see that a Kreiselean position would be more restrictive than
Carnap’s. We are not free to make arbitrary stipulations, but we proceed by identifying what
we already take to be true. But accepting such a position involves accepting some degree
of relativism. Remember it was never claimed that these intuitive notions are universal or
innate. What was claimed was that prior to an axiomatization there is at least a group of
16 In fact, given that ideas are finite in number, this is obviously incompatible with the view I am
defending.
17 Of course, one could claim that although the equator does not exist as a thing-in-itself, the
statement’s objective truth depends on it being translatable into a sentence whose terms do refer
to ultimate constituents of the world. If this is the true criterion of objective truth, however, then
we would have to admit that we have no idea what kinds of things are objectively true.
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mathematicians who have a coherent informal notion and can recognize that the axioms
are true relative to this notion. In the introduction to Potter (2000) there is a discussion of
a group of people whose notion of natural number does not exceed five. If we assume that
the anthropological facts reported here are true then what we identify as holding of our
notion of number does not hold for theirs. Given that our mathematical notions are neither
innate nor universal, it seems we need to acknowledge that mathematical truths are truths
relative to a conceptual scheme. This is a less relativistic position than Carnap’s but more
so than Wright and Hale.
I want to turn now to an objection which could be made concerning the way I presented
ontological questions above. One might say I set up a false dilemma. We need not hold that
either reality can somehow play the role of ultimate arbiter of our semantic theories or that
there is no notion of correctness or incorrectness in semantics. There is an intermediate
position known to us. We can say, following Quine, that it is reality as best described by
our scientific theories that decides if our semantic theory gets things right. However, the
problem with this Quinean move is that there is no straightforward sense in which science
tells us what there is.18 There is no one science that tells us about all that exists, and there
are many things that exist (such as the socket wrench set in my desk drawer) of which no
science says anything.
One might avoid this objection by admitting that science will not tell us what specific
things exist, but science tells us what general kinds of things exist. The existence of socket
wrenches as a type of thing may be implied by history or anthropology. So, in this case,
science can nonetheless answer, for instance, whether numbers exist. Now, if mathematics
were itself considered to be one of the sciences that got to answer what types of things exist,
then there would be nothing wrong with the ontological implications of the account of
mathematical truth. The account defended in this paper implies the existence of numbers,
and there is a science—mathematics—that also asserts the existence of such objects.
Of course, most who are sympathetic to the Quinean move would also restrict ‘science’
to include only the empirical sciences. With such a restriction, we are justified in asserting
the existence of mathematical objects only if their existence is presupposed by empirical
science. However, this seems to get the dependence backward. That we can’t do physics
without mathematics tells us more about physics than it does about mathematics. Even
if tomorrow a brilliant new nominalistic physical theory were presented, one with every
possible virtue, it simply would not be the case that mathematical theorems, like the
propositions of phlogiston theory, would be viewed as a mere curiosity in the history of
thought. Mathematics would not become simply a part of now-discarded physical theories,
because the truth of mathematical claims is independent of their role in physical theories.19
We can coherently engage in the practice of speaking of sets and natural numbers whether
or not they play any role in any empirical science.
§7. Conclusions. I hope to have outlined above a very natural answer to the Benac-
erraf dilemma. If we are able to do informal mathematics in the way that Kreisel thought
we could, then we have an understanding of certain concepts such that they possess more
properties than can be demonstrated to hold of them in any formal system. We can then use
this understanding of these concepts to lay out the truth conditions for statements involving
18 The argument presented here is inspired by an argument in Hacker (2006).
19 See Isaacson (2004) and again Hacker (2006) for more on this point.
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them. If we take from Frege the view that in order to explain how we have knowledge of
abstract objects we need only lay out the appropriate truth conditions, then there remain no
epistemic or metaphysical problems regarding our knowledge of mathematical truths. That
is, no problem beyond how it is that we are able to do informal mathematics in the first
place. This remaining problem does not itself seem insurmountable. In fact, in the case of
natural numbers we seem to have a fairly good understanding of how this works.
The most likely objection to the account given involves our freedom to stipulate that
what we can identify as holding of our mathematical notions is true. In order to legitimate
this move it was argued that our semantic theories are not responsible to the-world-as-it-
is-in-itself, nor is there a clear sense in which science gives us an answer as to what there
really is. Without any clear sense in which a theory of mathematical truth ultimately gets
things right or wrong, it seems our only guide in selecting semantic theories is naturalness
and agreement with common use. In these respects the theory under consideration does
very well.
If then, one is willing to accept two things, a completely satisfactory answer to the Be-
nacerraf problem can be given. The first is the assumption that our informal understanding
of mathematical notions is sufficient to fix the truth conditions for statements involving
mathematical terms. The second is the view that there is nothing else it is to be an object
than to be the reference of a term for which sentences containing the term have been
given sufficiently determinate truth conditions. This, then, at once solves the epistemic and
ontological horns of Benacerraf’s dilemma. Mathematical claims involve objects, since
they contain terms and have sufficiently clear truth conditions, at the same time we can
know them since we are able to do informal mathematics in the manner described.
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